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THE 1987 AMENDMENTS TO THE MONTANA




In January of 1985, Governor Schwinden appointed a special
advisory council to study the workers' compensation system in
Montana and suggest appropriate revisions.1 This review was
sorely needed as a result of many factors. The Montana workers'
compensation system had become too expensive,2 too litigious3 and
too unpredictable.4 The system was in turmoil. To discount the
significance of such a state of affairs is to ignore the economic and
legal reality of the situation. The short term benefit to claimants
and their attorneys which resulted from the hyperextension of the
historical limits of the system would have, if left unchecked, most
severely impaired the rights and benefits of future claimants.
Those who argue that the system needed no change or, incred-
ibly, was too restrictive, fail to grasp the obvious. Higher costs and
loss ratios beyond one hundred percent5 cause increased premiums
* B.A., University of Montana, 1974; J.D., University of Montana, 1977; Partner, Gar-
lington, Lohn & Robinson, Missoula.
1. Exec. Order 1-85, Office of the Governor, State of Montana (Jan. 15, 1985). The
council was made up of 18 members selected by the Governor to represent all interest
groups involved in the workers' compensation system. In May of 1985, Executive Order 1-85
was amended by Governor Schwinden to change some of the individuals serving on the 18-
member council. Amend. to Exec. Order 1-85, Office of the Governor, State of Montana
(May 13, 1985).
2. For example, between fiscal years 1977 and 1986, the annual cost of claims with the
State Compensation Insurance Fund increased 577%, from 9.5 million to 64.3 million dol-
lars. During this same period, the number of claims increased by only 67%. McKINNEY,
REPORT OF THE MONTANA OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE FISCAL ANALYST TO THE LEGISLATIVE
FINANCE CoMmi'rr at 9-10 (Apr. 6, 1988). These figures document a significant increase in
the cost of the system as well as an amazing increase in the cost per claim. Such conclusions
exist regardless of one's opinions on the reason for the present unfunded liability in the
State Fund.
3. According to data provided by the Workers' Compensation Court, Helena, Mont.,
petition filings in fiscal years 1981 totaled 211, 1982 totaled 351, 1983 totaled 405, 1984
totaled 437 and 1985 totaled 646.
4. One need only count the number of Workers' Compensation Court decisions and
appellate decisions dealing with workers' compensation cases between the late seventies and
1985. Regardless of one's philosophical bent and independent of one's opinion as to the
propriety of the direction, any objective analysis indicates a significant judicial expansion of
concepts in workers' compensation during the period.
5. Loss ratios reflect the percentage of benefit cost over premium received. Loss ratios
for all private workers' compensation carriers in Montana were 125% in 1985 and 161% in
1986. For the period 1984-1987, the largest private carrier in the state had a loss ratio of
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to employers. Increased business expenses affect continuation in
business, discourage new business and detract from the number of
wage earners in the state. Less profits, fewer employees and fewer
businesses create innumerable pressures on the Montana economy
that affect all working people, injured and healthy. No small part
of Montana's poor business reputation and inability to attract new
jobs is directly related to the various problems caused by the work-
ers' compensation system.'
In his charge to the council, Governor Schwinden requested
that the study and subsequent recommendations be "people sensi-
tive and cost conscious."7 This dual objective created a difficult
balancing act. After eighteen months of detailed study the council
presented the Governor with its recommendations for change. The
reform package was far reaching and appeared to represent the
compromise necessary to meet appropriately the challenge
presented by the Governor.'
The Schwinden administration chose to present to the legisla-
ture a reform package of its own.' Many of the fundamental por-
tions of the package were either identical to council recommenda-
tions or closely resembled them. A number of the reform proposals
were vastly different.10 In the end a bill was passed that again was
the product of compromise.
Some may argue that the final reforms were solely a govern-
ment and industry pillage of workers. This position evidences a
lack of appreciation for the underlying problem. It also ignores the
fact that many far reaching and more drastic potential reform pos-
sibilities were considered and scrapped by those seeking the
151%. McKINNEY, supra note 2, at 6-7. The counterpoint article in this issue (see,
Trieweiler, The New Workers' Compensation Act-Something for All Montanans to Be
Ashamed of), which claims that the State Fund rates are competitive and that this fact
proves the point that premiums are not too high in the state fails to consider one critical
fact. The State Fund is almost 200 million dollars in the hole. If it charged rates which were
actuarially sound, the rates would be substantially higher than they are and would far ex-
ceed the other states mentioned in the survey.
6. The cost of doing business in Montana includes, in addition to high insurance pre-
miums for workers' compensation, comprehensive general liability and premises liability, a
payroll tax of 0.3% earmarked to reduce the State Fund's unfunded liability.
7. Exec. Order 1-85, Office of the Governor, State of Montana (Jan. 15, 1985).
8. WORKERS' COMPENSATION ADVISORY COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES IN
THE MONTANA SYSTEM, June 23, 1986 [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS]. (The legislative pro-
posals were introduced by Senator Fred Van Valkenburg, Missoula, Mont..)
9. S.B. 315, 50th Sess.
10. The original administration proposal sought, among other things, to abolish the
Workers' Compensation Court and create an administrative adjudication process with dis-
trict court review. Id. Interestingly, the administration proposal rejected the Governor's
Council's decision to reduce the maximum duration of permanent partial disability benefits
to 325 weeks. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 8, at 11.
[Vol. 50
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amendments because of the legitimate balancing process that was
undertaken.11
The amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act are per-
vasive.12 Estimates of dollar savings to the system resulting from
the 1987 amendments range from twenty to twenty-five percent. A
legitimate analysis of the savings will take a number of years.
Court interpretations and later legislative modifications create sig-
nificant contingencies.
The task of analyzing the amendments from a defense per-
spective could be an impossible one if approached from a good law/
bad law perspective. It is too simplistic to examine the changes on
the basis solely of dollars to the claimant. If it were feasible, no
one would argue against maximum compensation for individuals
injured in the course and scope of their employment. The stark
reality of the matter is that the total dollars in the system had to
be reduced. The true measure of the amendments must be in
terms of the balancing of interests and creation of a structure that
delivers fair and effective benefits to those most in need.
In addition, a discussion of the changes in the Act, or even of
the provisions that existed before 1987, cannot be developed from
the perspective of making the claimant "whole." The workers'
compensation system is not akin to the general tort system. A
number of trade-offs between employers and employees form the
foundation of the system. As Professor A. Larson notes:
Almost every major error that can be observed in the devel-
opment of compensation law, whether judicial or legislative, can
be traced either to the importation of tort ideas, or, less fre-
quently, to the assumption that the right to compensation resem-
bles the right to the proceeds of a personal insurance policy.
Among common-law trained lawyers and judges, it has natu-
rally been the tort-connection fallacy that has been most
prevalent.13
We must remember that certain fundamental societal choices
were made in developing the American workers' compensation sys-
11. For example, the 500 week maximum duration of permanent partial disability ben-
efits was reinstated. Court abolition was forsaken and informal dispute resolution and medi-
ation requirements were instituted. As discussed infra at notes 37 through 39 and accompa-
nying text, a number of benefit increases were included in the package. S.B. 315, 50th Sess.,
ch. 464, 1987 Mont. Laws 1.
12. The Workers' Compensation Act became effective July 1, 1987. Act of April 14,
1987, ch. 464, 1987 Mont. Laws 1092.
13. 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 1.20 (1985). It should also be noted
that the Montana Constitution excepts employer liability to workers, where proper coverage
is in place, from "full legal redress" concepts. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16.
1989]
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tern. Society has chosen to provide adequate no-fault coverage to
employees, free of charge, to insure that a safety net is available
guaranteeing a certain level of relief for work injuries. Society
thereby saves the cost of caring for such individuals through its
social programs. Society does not and cannot avoid dealing with
the cost of the program, and so spreads it throughout the commer-
cial community. 4 Society makes value judgments, though, in bal-
ancing the cost of the system against the benefits to be received.
There is not and cannot be an unlimited supply of such benefits.
No system could accomplish or afford the goal of making an in-
jured person "whole." Again, the system, and therefore the amend-
ments to our Act, can be analyzed only by balancing all of the vari-
ous interests involved.
There are a number of significant changes in the new Act, and
it is impossible to detail all of them within the scope of the present
article. For our purposes, a review of four critical areas-policy,
injury definition, benefits and dispute resolution-is undertaken.
II. POLICY
The legislature specifically set out its declaration of policy in
amending the Act.'" The specified objective of the reform package
14. Professor Larson notes:
And so, by this simple demonstration of alternatives, we see that workmen's
compensation, far from being a violation of moral principle, is in fact the only
morally satisfactory solution of the problem of the injured workman, once one
concedes that morality has a group as well as an individual aspect. Of course, not
every compensable injury is of the severity to present the poorhouse as an alterna-
tive to compensation, but the principle for lesser injuries is the same: There is an
attempt to ensure that the claimant continues to receive the bare minimum in-
come and medical care to keep him from destitution. The ultimate "social philoso-
phy," then, behind nonfault compensation liability is the desirability of providing,
in the most efficient, most dignified, and most certain form, financial and medical
benefits which an enlightened community would feel obliged to provide in any
case in some less satisfactory form, and of allocating the burden of these payments
to the most appropriate source.
LARSON, supra note 13, at § 2.20.
15. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-105 (1987), states:
(1) It is an objective of the Montana workers' compensation system to pro-
vide, without regard to fault, wage supplement and medical benefits to a worker
suffering from a work-related injury or disease. Wage-loss benefits are not in-
tended to make an injured worker whole; they are intended to assist a worker at a
reasonable cost to the employer. Within that limitation, the wage-loss benefit
should bear a reasonable relationship to actual wages lost as a result of a work-
related injury or disease.
(2) A worker's removal from the work force due to a work-related injury or
disease has a negative impact on the worker, the worker's family, the employer,
and the general public. Therefore, it is an objective of the workers' compensation
system to return a worker to work as soon as possible after the worker has suf-
[Vol. 50
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was to provide fair compensation for industrial injuries. However,
right from the outset the lawmakers indicated that the cost of the
system precludes making all injured workers whole. Return to
work is given a priority status as is the speedy and effective deliv-
ery of benefits.'6
Tough problems often require tough choices. The balancing of
interests envisioned by the introductory statements permeate the
revisions which follow. Regardless of our philosophical bent or cho-
sen professional direction, we are compelled to accept such direc-
tion as fair and appropriate.
Fearing that its attempt to revise the Workers' Compensation
Act comprehensively would suffer the same fate as its past piece-
meal attempts, the legislature, in the policy section of the new law,
abolishes liberal construction. 7 Quite appropriately, the legislature
indicated its desire that the Act be applied by the courts as writ-
ten. Although such direction may, in reality, be more ceremonial
than substantive, the effort legitimately reiterates a needed direc-
tion of quick, sure and predictable benefits.
The philosophical direction evidenced by the policy section
and the actual amendments which follow it serve to shake the
mindset that had developed in our workers' compensation system
and the people in it. That mindset, nudged along by the courts,
presumes some unquestioned cradle-to-grave, carte blanche obliga-
tion of employers for all physical conditions that befall employees
within the ever expanding net of coverage and benefits. The new
law gives notice that workers have rights, but so do employers; that
fair compensation is not boundless; and that it is in everyone's
long-term interest to reel in the cost and scope of the system.
III. DEFINITION OF INJURY
Over the years the scope of what constituted a compensable
industrial injury expanded much further than any statutory
fered a work-related injury or disease.
(3) Montana's workers' compensation and occupational disease insurance sys-
tems are intended to be primarily self-administering. Claimants should be able to
speedily obtain benefits, and employers should be able to provide coverage at rea-
sonably constant rates. To meet these objectives, the system must be designed to
minimize reliance upon lawyers and the courts to obtain benefits and interpret
liabilities.
(4) Title 39, chapters 71 and 72, must be construed according to their terms
and not liberally in favor of any party.
16. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-7-105(2), (3) (1987).
17. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-105(4) (1987).
19891
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amendment to the definition.18 The result was unduly costly to the
system.19 For a number of reasons, the court expansion of the defi-
nition fostered the unpredictability and inequitable results which
begged for reform.2
With the judicial decision to compensate repetitive trauma,21
it became difficult to draw lines between occupational disease,22 in-
jury, the natural aging process of older workers and non-occupa-
tionally caused problems. The definition may have become so
broad that a number of clearly compensable occupational diseases
became defined as injuries by pursuing what appeared to be a logi-
cal thought process to an unrealistic conclusion.23 It became effec-
tively impossible to disprove an aggravation because the claimant's
burden of proof regarding the possibility of aggravation or acceler-
ation2 4 was virtually always maintainable. Finally, the courts con-
cluded that in the tough causation cases the claimant need not be
constrained by a lack of medical science and could prevail on ques-
tionable probabilities.25
In addition, it was becoming increasingly apparent that new
frontiers in relation to cardiovascular problems and stress in the
workplace, so called "mental-mental" and "mental-physical" cases,
were about to be charted. 2 The cost, scope and difficulty of such
additional expansions was, to many, unpalatable absent legislative
approval.
18. See infra, notes 22-27 and accompanying text. In fact, prior to the 1987 amend-
ments, the definition of "injury" had not been modified by the legislature since 1973.
19. The judicial expansions, whether appropriate or not, significantly expanded com-
pensability and therefore increased cost, many times years after the event in question. Since
no premium was or could be collected under such circumstances this course accounted for
large losses.
20. Decisions such as those cited infra, notes 22-27, created an atmosphere where it
was quite difficult to determine the extent of the definition.
21. See Hoehne v. Granite Lumber Co., 189 Mont. 221, 615 P.2d 863 (1980).
22. See McMahon v. Anaconda Co., 208 Mont. 482, 678 P.2d 661 (1984).
23. See Bremer v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, No. 8407-2557, slip op. (Workers'
Comp. Ct. June 27, 1985), aff'd, Bremer v. Buerkle, - Mont. -, 727 P.2d 529 (1986)
(without discussing particularly the extended rationale of the Hearing Examiner).
24. See, e.g., Viets v. Sweet Grass County, 178 Mont. 337, 583 P.2d 1070 (1978);
Standberg v. Reber Co., 179 Mont. 173, 587 P.2d 18 (1978).
25. Conway v. Blackfeet Indian Developers, Inc., 205 Mont. 459, 669 P.2d 225 (1983);
Lamb v. Missoula Imports, Inc., 211 Mont. 360, 684 P.2d 498 (1984); see also Hengel v.
Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, - Mont. ., 730 P.2d 1163 (1986).
26. "Mental-mental" refers to situations where mental problems are caused by mental,
rather than physical, stimuli. Likewise, "mental-physical" cases involve physical conditions
attributed to non-physical causes. See Tocco v. City of Great Falls, - Mont. __, 714
P.2d 160 (1986); Ferdinand v. Lodge #456, - Mont. - , 719 P.2d 775 (1986); Gulbraa
v. Alco Energy Prod's., - Mont. __, 731 P.2d 1302 (1987); Snyder v. San Francisco
Feed & Grain, - Mont. -, 748 P.2d 924 (1987).
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The new definition of injury is significant.2 7 It retains the ac-
cepted concepts of traumatic incident or unusual strain, but re-
quires that the event, or series of events, occur on a single day or
work shift. As such, the definition reemploys one of the classic dif-
ferentiations between injury and disease, time definiteness.28 By
also expanding the definition of occupational disease, consistency
between the two Acts was fostered.2 9
The new definition does not appear to preclude a claimant's
previous right to elect between coverage under the Workers' Com-
pensation Act or Occupational Disease Act under appropriate cir-
cumstances.3 0 However, a single work shift aggravation would have
to be proven, as do all aggravations under the new law, by a pre-
ponderance of the medical evidence.$1
By reimposing the classic differentiation between injury and
27. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119 (1987), states:
(1) "Injury" or "injured" means:
(a) internal or external physical harm to the body;
(b) damage to prosthetic devices or appliances, except for damage to eye-
glasses, contact lenses, dentures, or hearing aids; or
(c) death.
(2) An injury is caused by an accident. An accident is:
(a) an unexpected traumatic incident or unusual strain;
(b) identifiable by time and place of occurrence;
(c) identifiable by member or part of the body affected; and
(d) caused by a specific event on a single day or during a single work shift.
(3) "Injury" or "injured" does not mean a physical or mental condition arising
from:
(a) emotional or mental stress; or
(b) a nonphysical stimulus or activity.
(4) "Injury" or "injured" does not include a disease that is not caused by an
accident.
(5) A cardiovascular, pulmonary, respiratory, or other disease, cerebrovascular ac-
cident, or myocardial infarction suffered by a worker is an injury only if the acci-
dent is the primary cause of the physical harm in relation to other factors contrib-
uting to the physical harm.
The counterpoint article in this issue, Trieweiler, supra note 5, exaggerates the effect of the
amendment to the Act in a number of factual situations. It also ignores the expansion of the
definition of occupational disease.
28. See McMahon, 208 Mont. at 485, 678 P.2d at 663.
29. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-72-102 (1987), in part states:
(10) "Occupational disease" means harm, damage, or death as set forth in 39-
71-119(1) arising out of or contracted in the course and scope of employment and
caused by events occurring on more than a single day or work shift. The term does
not include a physical or mental condition arising from emotional or mental stress
or from a nonphysical stimulus or activity.
30. Ridenour v. Equity Supply Co., 204 Mont. 473, 665 P.2d 783 (1983).
31. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-407(2)(b) (1987). The 1987 amendments also restate the
burden of proof in all of the traditional benefit levels of temporary total (MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 39-71-701(2) (1987)), permanent total (MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-702(2) (1987)), and per-
manent partial disability (MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-703(2) (1987)).
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disease, the new law attains a modicum of necessary predictability.
It also maintains the assurance that conditions caused by the
workplace will be compensated. By limiting benefits for injuries
but effectively enlarging compensability potential under the Occu-
pational Disease Act, the definitions provide a more equitable ap-
portionment of risk and cost to situations involving industrial and
non-industrial causative factors. Those situations that legitimately
involve minimal workplace effects will be treated appropriately as
such.
Both the Workers' Compensation Act and the Occupational
Disease Act now preclude compensation for mental and physical
problems caused by "non-physical stimulus," that is, emotional
stress.3  This modification, again, provides clarity to a gray area.
The choice to remove stress-caused conditions from the Act is a
tough one, perhaps one of the more difficult but necessary balanc-
ing considerations of the reform movement.
The removal of mental-mental and mental-physical claims
from compensability is not as radical as some might argue. After
all, in the eighty-one year history of the Act they have never been
clearly compensable in any event. There are no statistics available,
but it would not appear that the restrictions will affect any large
number of claimants. The few that it does preclude are, though,
likely to be very difficult and expensive cases.33 This effort to re-
duce costs and uncertainty in a fashion affecting the least number
of workers for the benefit of a much larger group is an appropriate
choice.
The new definition of injury (as opposed to disease) also re-
stricts the workers' compensation compensability of heart and lung
disease. Such conditions can still be found to be occupational dis-
eases and remain compensable as injuries so long as the specific
workplace event constitutes a primary cause of the condition.
Again, this was a tough choice. Again, it was a costly gray area
affecting a relatively small number. Again, an appropriate balance
was reached.
The vast number of claimants suffer a legitimate injury at a
specific point in time while at work. These individuals are unaf-
fected by the new definition. Those on the periphery, with claims
and conditions clouded by numerous other factors, may not receive
32. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119(3)(a) (1987).
33. Also, by closing the door on compensability for alleged stress-caused conditions,
untold future expansion is probably stopped before it even begins. The nature of pure stress
claims begs for unrestricted subjective opinion on causation. Once this ball began to roll,
there was no stopping it without action by the legislature.
[Vol. 50
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full compensation or any compensation at all. Those with solid
workplace connections may well find compensation under the Oc-
cupational Disease Act. The courts will appropriately consider
non-work-related causative factors. Those totally uncompensated
will retain their right to pursue common law remedies if there is
workplace connection and employer fault.
IV. BENEFITS
Benefit amendments are the most difficult area of the new law
to discuss from the defense perspective. The difficulty does not
arise as a result of a lack of need for change or a lack of primarily
appropriate change. The difficulty arises from the fact that benefit
changes, the changes that save the necessary costs in the system,
always take money out of some claimant's hands. To approve of
such changes leaves one wide open to broadside charges of a lack
of feeling, compassion or understanding of the injured worker's
predicament. As indicated previously, the changes are necessary,
the decisions are tough and the goal must be to spend the dollars
available appropriately and effectively. Reform cannot be guided
by anecdotal example and so, regrettably, some very legitimate, al-
though limited, difficulties will arise.
One of the fundamental changes in the workers' compensation
benefit scheme is the creation of the job pool concept.34 This new
approach is a geographical expansion of the traditional "normal la-
bor market" considerations to a statewide basis.35 This expansion
34. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-1011(7)(a) (1987), states:
(a) "Worker's job pool" means those jobs typically available for which a worker is
qualified, consistent with the worker's age, education, vocational experience and
aptitude and compatible with the worker's physical capacities and limitations as
the result of the worker's injury. Lack of immediate job openings is not a factor to
be considered.
35. Under previously existing law, a determination of permanent total disability re-
quired the establishment by the claimant of (a) what jobs were included in his normal labor
market pre-injury, and (b) the total inability of the claimant to engage in any such normal
labor market jobs due to the disability resulting from the industrial injury. Metzger v.
Chemetron Corp., 212 Mont. 351, 687 P.2d 1033 (1984). Likewise, normal labor market con-
siderations were critical in determining the rate of biweekly permanent partial disability
under former MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-703 (1985). The rate paid for the maximum dura-
tion allowable pursuant to McDanold v. B.N. Transp., Inc., - Mont. -, 701 P.2d 1001
(1985), appeal after remand, 208 Mont. 470, 679 P.2d 1188 (1984), was calculated by com-
paring pre-injury and post-injury earning capacities in the normal labor market. Dunn v.
Champion Int'l Corp., - Mont. __, 720 P.2d 1186 (1986).
"Normal labor market," therefore, was a critical concept under the old law. The court
applied the concept on a limited geographical area, presumably a reasonable commuting
distance. Therefore, a claimant in an economically depressed rural area would fare far better
than an identically situated individual in a more sizeable community.
The new definition of job pool (MONT. CODE ANN. § 29-71-1011(7)(a) (1987)) extends the
1989]
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may well be an overreaction to the previous artificially-limited
scope of the principle. A happy medium between the two would
have been more equitable.
It is a fact that a number of workers simply do not have the
choice or ability to pursue a theoretical job position on the other
side of the state. Nonetheless, such individuals will be compen-
sated as though they had. This situation presents one of the more
difficult cost saving methods.
In addition to the job pool concept, the new law establishes a
priority scheme for potential permanent total disability cases."6
The scheme encourages return to work and discourages retraining
or business establishment unless they are last resorts. The ap-
proach is a good one. It is cost effective and consistent with the
policies of the Act. The emphasis of our system has, over time,
veered far off the course of attempting to return the claimant to
gainful employment in a cost efficient manner. Various unneces-
sary retraining and business schemes have permeated the court
docket over the last ten years. The result has been a fundamen-
tally misguided direction. Retraining and business ventures, when
necessary, can and should be pursued. In a wage supplement ori-
ented benefit system, they should not be pursued in derogation of
legitimate return-to-work options.
Individuals found to be permanently and totally disabled will
reach of normal labor market concepts to the entire state for each case. For example, a
claimant living in Yaak who would have been a permanent total disability claimant under
the old standard would not be under the new law if a job existed in Miles City which he
could do considering his age, education, experience and physical condition.
How can this be quantified, though? My sense is that such situations are not statisti-
cally significant. The example, though, presents the opportunity for some of the opposition's
most vociferous castigation of the new law.
36. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-1012 (1987), states:
Rehabilitation goal and options. (1) The goal of rehabilitation services is to
return a disabled worker to work, with a minimum of retraining, as soon as possi-
ble after an injury occurs.
(2) The first appropriate option among the following must be chosen for the
worker:
(a) return to the same position;
(b) return to a modified position;
(c) return to a related occupation suited to the claimant's education and mar-
ketable skills;
(d) on-the-job training;
(e) short-term retraining program (less than 24 months);
(f) long-term retraining program (48 months maximum); or
(g) self-employment.
(3) Whenever possible, employment in a worker's local job pool must be con-
sidered and selected prior to consideration of employment in a worker's statewide
job pool.
10
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now receive cost-of-living increases.3 7 This increase in benefits
under the Act is most appropriate. The direction is once again con-
sistent with the approach of increasing benefits for the most
clearly disabled.
The permanent partial disability amendments repeal the for-
mer schedule of injuries which limited benefits by body part af-
fected. 8 Now all events are "whole man" injuries with the maxi-
mum 500 weeks of benefits available. This increase in benefits for
those whose earning ability has been legitimately affected is also
most appropriate.3 9 Such a course of action again represents an ap-
proach of more adequately compensating the mainstream claimant
and more stringently putting those on the periphery to their proof.
Under the new law, as with the old, medically rated impair-
ments are paid without contest.40 Again, this direct and speedy
compensation for objective damage caused by injury is
appropriate.4'
Complicated "earning capacity" concepts have been replaced
with wage supplement benefit payments.42 The benefit is designed
as just that, a supplement.43 Consistent with the policy of the new
37. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-702(5) (1987).
38. The new permanent partial disability section, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-703
(1987), simply does not mention scheduled injuries. Former MoNT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-705
(1985), was repealed.
39. Under former methods of computing permanent partial disability benefits as re-
quired by either MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-703 (1985), or MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-71-705 to -
709 (1985), the schedule of MoNT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-705 (1985) controlled the duration of
benefits regardless of severity. As a result, inequitable situations could and did result. For
instance, a claimant whose permanently residual ankle fracture limited the claimant's abil-
ity to work far more than a claimant who suffered a back sprain would be limited to 180
weeks of benefits, as opposed to the maximum of 500 weeks available to the less-affected
back patient.
We must keep in mind, though, that any duration of partial disability benefits is totally
arbitrary. No duration scheme makes someone "whole." The system is unable to "make"
anyone "whole" and cannot be judged by an inability to do so.
40. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-703(1)(a) (1987). Each percentage of "whole man" im-
pairment equals five weeks of benefits at the appropriate rate calculation. The award may
be paid in a lump sum if the claimant desires, subject to a reduction to present value.
41. In the event a dispute exists concerning a rendered impairment rating, a panel
process administered by the Division of Workers' Compensation has been established.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-711 (1987). This approach is untested. The panel is one of the
examples of the administration's attempt to create more bureaucracy to circumvent the
court process. If handled fairly and expeditiously by the Division, the procedure will meet
its stated goal. Looking at past performance, one is necessarily suspect of the chance of
success of any duty delegated to the Division.
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-703(i)(b) (1987).
43. Supplements are calculated on the basis of comparing "actual wages" at the time
of injury to the "wages the worker is qualified to earn" post-injury. For some reason, admin-
istration officials refused to acknowledge this approach as dealing with earning capacity. In
fact, the changes do exclude pre-injury capacity concepts by mandating the use of the actual
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law, these permanent partial disability benefits are the product of
a quick and simple computation and are subject to delivery with-
out undue delay or litigation. The countervailing benefit is cer-
tainty, timeliness and cost savings. Detractors again may argue
that such an approach does not make the claimant whole. Of
course, it does not. No system can. The "old" law did not, and
neither does the new, nor could any other system of workers' com-
pensation partial disability benefits.
If a worker is not returned to work, a new total disability ben-
efit is paid during the period in which his work potential is evalu-
ated.44 Thereafter, if rehabilitation services are arranged, the
worker will continue to receive full benefits and auxiliary assis-
tance with incidental expenses. 45 Such an approach fosters com-
plete evaluation and payment of appropriate benefits under the
new scheme. It also bolsters the fundamental goal of prompt re-
turn to work.
The social security retirement cut-off statutes codify and ex-
pand recent court approaches to make that aspect of the system
more realistic. 46 If a worker is retired, the argument for compensat-
wages. The post-injury calculation, based on an amount the claimant is "qualified" to earn,
is certainly a "capacity" consideration.
Additional certainty is added to the system by limiting the claimant's entitlement to a
period of 500 weeks beginning on the date of medical stability. This change solidly fixes the
potential exposure on any claim.
44. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-1023 (1987). The benefit is paid for a period up to 26
weeks at the total disability rate.
The work potential is evaluated by a rehabilitation panel created pursuant to MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-71-1016 to -1018 (1987). The whole panel approach is caught up in a maze
of hard-to-understand statutory reform that no doubt will be considered by the courts re-
peatedly. The approach is subject to significant reservations. See supra note 41. Under any
circumstances, the approach begs for clarification and streamlining.
During the preparation of this article, it has become apparent that the Division of
Workers' Compensation is inappropriately interpreting the obligation of carriers to pay the
total rehabilitation benefit in some cases. The Division seems to be directing payment of
such benefits in all cases where the claimant has reached medical stability and is not able to
return to his or her former position either because of inability or unavailability. In so doing,
the Division is ignoring the supreme court holding in Coles v. 7-11 Stores, - Mont. __,
704 P.2d 1048 (1985), and the statutory basis for such benefits. In addition, the Division is
ignoring its own Rule, ADMIN. R. MoNr. 24.29.1702(2)(b), which presupposes the possibility
of a claimant appearing before the rehabilitation panel without receiving the total rehabili-
tation benefit payments.
The continued viability of the Coles criteria cannot be questioned. The ability of a
carrier to properly reduce the claimant from total disability to partial disability benefits,
under appropriate circumstances, pending review by the rehabilitation panel, is soundly
based in the new amendments. It is quite troubling that the Division, who fought so hard
for reform, chooses to stifle its application upon every opportunity presented.
45. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-71-1024, 1025 (1987).
46. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-710 (1987) provides that:
(1) If a claimant is receiving disability or rehabilitation compensation benefits and
12
Montana Law Review, Vol. 50 [1989], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol50/iss1/5
1989] MONTANA WORKERS' COMPENSATION 115
ing him for his long-term loss of actual earnings is not present, so
long as his temporary total status, impairment and medical bene-
fits are fully covered. This is certainly another example of appro-
priate but more limited coverage for a small percentage of the total
number of claimants in order to benefit the majority.
Perhaps the sole greatest cost savings in the new system is the
limitation of lump sums and the requirement of present value re-
duction when cases are settled.4 7 The past abuse of the lump sum
settlement procedure caused a drain of untold proportions on the
system. The refusal to apply the necessary concept of reducing fu-
ture dollars paid today to present value ignored economic reality.
These new provisions will not eradicate lump sums or settlements.
As the system develops, cases will continue to be closed and lump
sums paid. They will, however, represent a more sound economic
approach.
All in all, the benefit reductions are sound and produce the
least hardship to a small number of individuals. Benefit increases
are appropriately placed through the necessary balancing process.
Though the bureaucratic processes of the impairment panel and
rehabilitation services need to be revamped somewhat, the tough
decisions were made and the system will begin to rebound as a
result.
the claimant receives social security retirement benefits or is eligible to receive full
social security retirement benefits, the claimant is considered to be retired. When
the claimant is considered retired, the liability of the insurer is ended for payment
of wage supplement, permanent total disability, and rehabilitation compensation
benefits. However, the insurer remains liable for temporary total disability bene-
fits, any impairment award, and medical benefits.
(2) If a claimant who is eligible to receive social security retirement benefits and is
gainfully employed suffers a work-related injury, the insurer retains liability for
temporary total disability benefits, any impairment award, and medical benefits.
The inconsistent language utilized begs for technical clarification, though.
47. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741 (1987). The new approach limits all lump sums on
partial cases. No lump sum can be paid without the agreement of the carrier. Significant
limitations are also present in advance payments for total disability cases. [See Comment,
1987 Changes to Lump Sum Payment Provisions in the Montana Workers' Compensation
Act, this issue, for discussion. -Ed.]
During the period in which the system was being studied and during the time that the
legislation was being debated, it appeared that all proponents of reform were uniformly
supporting voluntary settlements. As noted above, such settlements, lump sum payments,
would only be possible if the carrier agreed. This, of course, is the form of the amendment
to Section 741.
As this article is being prepared, we see the Division of Workers' Compensation repeat-
edly refusing to approve settlements under the "new act." The ostensible reasons for these
refusals appear fluid and inconsistent. Again, for some reason, the Division appears to be
attempting to thwart reform which it sponsored and supported previously.
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V. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES
By the early 1980s the Workers' Compensation Court was over
utilized. Too high a percentage of claims found their way to the
court."' The influx of litigation was caused by the large sums of
money available, persistent inconsistencies in judicial holdings and
exorbitant attorney's fees. The litigation process was often initi-
ated prematurely.40
The new Act requires an attempt at informal dispute resolu-
tion through "documented demand." 50 Such a process requires a
prospective litigant to evaluate and document his position. This
change was sorely needed and is a very positive development if
properly utilized and enforced.
Non-binding mediation compels further evaluation and case
preparation which can lead only to more frequent early resolution
of problems. The strength of mediation is directly proportional to
the quality of the mediators and to the efforts of the parties. We
are already seeing the benefits of properly conducted mediation.52
Regrettably, we are also already seeing the utter waste of time in
the process when the parties or the mediator are not serious about
the proceeding or are not fully prepared.58 The concept is a good
one and should be strengthened rather than watered down.
Counsel on both sides of the claim may personally benefit by
48. See supra note 4.
49. The court refused to construe strictly the statute as requiring that a "controversy"
exist before jurisdiction arose. This resulted in claims first being brought to the attention of
an employer in the form of a court petition. The council later recommended the informal
dispute resolution requirements, which were added to the Act. RECOMMENDATiONS, supra
note 8, at 52-53.
50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-2401 (1987).
51. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-71-2406 to -2411 (1987). During the preparation of this
article, the Montana Supreme Court decided Carmichael v. Workers' Comp. Ct., - Mont.
-, 763 P.2d 1122 (1988). The court refused to apply mandatory mediation to claims for
injuries occurring before July 1, 1987, the effective date of the reform amendments.
52. My personal experience indicates that where there is proper disclosure, competent
and prepared counsel, and active support by the mediator, a very high percentage of cases
have settled.
53. When attorneys approach mediation as only a necessary delay and do not provide
sufficient documentation or adequately evaluate the case, mediation rarely works. Part of
the problem is that the rules do not provide sufficient direction to the parties. It is sug-
gested that the court, by order, or the Department of Labor, by promulgation, adopt more
specific guidelines and sanctions to thwart this attitude.
In a few cases the mediator has been satisfied to simply hear the arguments and make a
recommendation that is nothing more than a baby-splitting exercise. This is not frequent,
however. An effective mediation requires a mediator who knows the law and facts and who
encourages a legitimate discussion of the issues being mediated. The mediator's recommen-
dation should be detailed, relying on the parties' arguments and providing a solid rationale
for the recommendation. Regulations should require this approach.
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not seriously utilizing the mediation process. Their clients do not.
All counsel would be serving their clients and the system by ear-
nestly and appropriately utilizing the process. Those few who, for
personal gain or spite, seek to thwart the process without good
cause should be called to account.
The administration's initial reform proposals sought to do
away with the Workers' Compensation Court and establish another
unmanageable bureaucracy.54 This approach was misguided. It was
primarily fostered by the Division's paranoia and repeated claims
that attorneys and courts were the cause of all that was bad in the
world of workers' compensation. No small part of the Division's
public ire appeared to be a well-placed smoke screen to justify or
allegedly account for the unbelievable deficit that had surfaced on
the books of the State Compensation Insurance Fund.5
There is no question that the Workers' Compensation Court
should be retained. The court presents a specialized forum for ad-
judication of very technical legal and medical matters. The at-
tempt to reinsert the district courts into the workers' compensa-
tion arena at an appeal level in a multi-phased bureaucratic
quagmire was ill-conceived and contrary to the good sense of any-
one who has dealt with the Montana system in the last decade. In
many cases the court provides very necessary impartial protection
from the Division itself.
The 1987 amendments not only retain the court, but also
strengthen it in a number of important ways. The judges of the
Workers' Compensation Court were granted new powers consistent
with those of a district court judge to maintain order and compel
obedience to court orders.51 In a move that guarantees more consis-
tency in its proceedings, the court is now required to follow the
Montana Rules of Evidence.5 7 Finally, a provision consistent with
Rule 11 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure was enacted to
help assure that those involving themselves in the court process
will present and maintain only those positions and actions which
are appropriate.5
The entire dispute resolution process provides a framework
designed to assist those involved in the system to resolve their dis-
putes in a timely and equitable fashion. The new process will re-
54. S.B. 315, 50th Sess., ch. 464, 1987 Mont. Laws 1.
55. The State Compensation Insurance Fund suffers from an unfunded liability esti-
mated at 150 million dollars in 1987. McKINNEY, supra note 2, at 4.
56. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-2901 (1987).
57. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-2903 (1987).
58. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-2914 (1987).
1989]
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duce litigation and assist in meeting the goal of efficient and
speedy delivery of benefits.
The system is not perfect and needs some fine tuning in rela-
tion to required efforts and evidence at mediation, more stringent
guidelines for participation by the parties and a fixed framework
for the mediator's involvement. A number of the remaining proce-
dural problems with the Workers' Compensation Court system can
be handled adequately through a comprehensive reworking of the
court's rules.
Many of the detractors of the new process, having become ac-
customed to running to the court at every turn, may point to the
time element as a deficiency in the new system. Many of these
same individuals were content to litigate every action, incur the
significant monetary and emotional cost to the claimant, and sit by
for a longer period of time awaiting a decision from the
overburdened court.
The direction of the new dispute resolution process is one
which fosters early evaluation, discussion and mutual compromise.
This is most appropriate. This direction is superior to past
practices.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unquestionably, some claimants receive less under the new
law than under the old. Some claimants receive nothing under the
new Act although they would have under the old. Most claimants,
those in the mainstream of the system, however, are adequately
and fairly protected and in a few very important areas receive
greater benefits under the new Act.
The new workers' compensation system is designed to work on
a budget that is more realistic. In the long run, such an approach
improves the lot of the working person by assisting in the rebuild-
ing of a strong and viable system. We see on the national budget
deficit scene individuals who espouse responsible belt-tightening
but do not have the stomach to effect such an effort. Our legisla-
ture accepted the challenge. Even with the inevitable fine-tuning
and modification necessary with a new approach, we are much bet-
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